History: six times the pipes broke and an answer came
These are not predictions. They are six real episodes, each date checkable against an official source, listed oldest to newest. Read them for one thing only: how long the gap was between the first visible trouble and the official answer — and how long until it was actually over.
Why six, and not three or twelve
Six is the smallest number that covers the range of speeds actually observed — from 5 days to 850 days — without teaching the same lesson twice.
Why not three: the three easiest to name (2007–08, 2020, 2022) all got an answer inside four months. Three cases would quietly teach that answers always come fast, and would hide the 124-day, 203-day and 850-day cases that make this dashboard's own forecast honest: 24.0% within 12 months, even odds only by March 2029 — a percentile, not a date.
Why not twelve: past six, a reader stops holding the cases in his head, the extra cases repeat mechanisms already shown, and older ones are harder to date to the month — which is exactly where invented history creeps in.
The six episodes, oldest to newest
1When every bank in the country shut for a week
2Four banks failed in one month
3The funds nobody could put a price on
4The promise with no money behind it
5The fortnight that did not become 2008
6The pension funds that nearly blew up in five days
And sometimes nothing comes
Every episode above ends with a dated announcement, because that is what gets written down. But an announcement is not guaranteed. On this dashboard’s own count, a stress line was past its firing level in 163 of 287 month-ends since 2003 — breaks are common — and an official answer eventually arrived in 6 of 10 armed episodes. Four in ten, it did not. Two of those are real, datable, and had no facility at all:
The corporate default wave, 2000–03. Measured month by month, the US junk-bond spread was above 5% — the level this dashboard treats as a break for that line — at every single month-end from February 2000 to September 2003 — 44 months in a row, peaking at 10.59% on 31 October 2002. It came back below 5% on 31 October 2003, at 4.73%. There is no facility to name for those 44 months, because none was created.
The energy and commodity squeeze, 2015–16. The same spread was above 5% at every month-end from July 2015 to August 2016 — 14 months in a row, peaking at 8.87% on 11 February 2016. Nothing was announced. The Fed went the other way: it raised its policy rate on 16 December 2015, while the spread was still above the level.
What made those two different from the six? What was broken. In all six answered episodes a payment pipe had stopped working — banks that could not pay depositors, banks that would not lend to each other overnight, a bond market with no buyers. A central bank has a tool that fits that exactly: lend against collateral, or get a law passed that guarantees the deposits. In 2000–03 and 2015–16 nothing in the payment pipes stopped working. The loss fell on people who had lent money to ordinary companies — telecoms and dot-coms in the first case, oil and mining companies in the second — and there is no facility that makes a company able to repay. Defaults, restructurings and time did the work instead.
Both of these did eventually end. They ended without an announcement, and “eventually” is doing real work in that sentence: 44 months and 14 months of the stress line sitting above its firing level.
One axis: how long the wait was
Same kind of event, response times 170 times apart. The number beside each row is the number; the bar is only that same number drawn to scale.
5 days — UK 2022
8 days — US 2020
124 days — Japan 1997
125 days — US 2007
203 days — Euro area 2009
850 days — US 1930
How the bars are drawn: width in per cent = days ÷ 850 × 100, rounded to the nearest whole per cent, with a floor of 3% so that the 5-day and 8-day rows stay visible. 5 days = 1% → 3%; 8 days = 1% → 3%; 124 days = 15%; 125 days = 15%; 203 days = 24%; 850 days = 100%.
Why the speeds differ
Three things decide it. First, what is broken. A funding market — the market for overnight loans between banks, or for government bills — can be backstopped in days by a central bank that already has the authority; a bank that is insolvent, or a government that cannot pay, cannot be fixed by lending alone. Second, whether the authority already exists. In 2007, 2008 and 2020 the Fed used powers it already had as lender of last resort. In 1933 the answer needed a law from Congress and a president who had been in office 36 hours; in Japan it needed public money put into banks for the first time in the country’s history, and the first attempt was too small. Third, whether the currency itself is the problem. In the euro area there was no single government standing behind the bonds, so the answer that finally worked had to wait for a political settlement — 1,053 days.
Notice also the second gap, between the first facility and the one that actually ended the episode. In 2007–08 the first facility came in 125 days and the bond buying that worked in 474; in the euro area, 203 days to the first purchase programme and 1,053 to the one that turned it; in Japan, 124 days to the first injection and 331 to the nationalisation, with a second injection four times larger a year after the first. The first announcement is not the finish line, and a reader who takes it as one will be wrong three times out of the six on this page.
The honest limit of historical analogy
These six all have an answer because history keeps the episodes that ended and files the others under “nothing happened”. So the six are not a probability: the correct base rate is the dashboard’s own finding, 6 of 10 armed episodes, not 6 of 6. Analogy also points the wrong way exactly when it feels most useful. The 2008 template said a credit bust means years of deflation and deleveraging; applied to March 2020 it predicted a long slump, and the recession was over in two months — the next problem was inflation. The 2010–12 template said a currency union without a fiscal union must break up; instead borrowing costs turned within days of a speech on 26 July 2012, and the programme that finally stopped the run — announced on 6 September 2012 — came with a condition that had been the obstacle all along: the country had to be inside a bailout programme first. What history is good for here is narrow and real: it shows the range of waiting times, it shows that the first answer is often not the last, and it shows what an answer looks like when it arrives. It does not tell you the date.
A popular story that is wrong
The claim: “The Fed pivoted in January 2019 with nothing broken.”
The data: the US junk-bond spread was 3.16% on 3 October 2018, 5.38% on 27 December 2018 and 5.44% on 3 January 2019 — above the firing level this dashboard uses for that line. It had come back to 4.37% by 31 January 2019. The “patient” language in the FOMC statement is dated 30 January 2019 — after the break, not before it.
Source: ICE BofA US High Yield Index option-adjusted spread (series BAMLH0A0HYM2), daily closes, all four prints read from the series history — fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLH0A0HYM2; FOMC statement, 30 January 2019 — federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20190130a.htm.
Sources for every date on this page
Federal Reserve History, “Banking Panics of 1930–31” — federalreservehistory.org/essays/banking-panics-1930-31
Federal Reserve History, “Bank Holiday of 1933” — federalreservehistory.org/essays/bank-holiday-of-1933
Federal Reserve History, “Emergency Banking Act of 1933” — federalreservehistory.org/essays/emergency-banking-act-of-1933
Federal Reserve History, “The Great Depression” — federalreservehistory.org/essays/great-depression
NBER, US Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions — nber.org/research/data/us-business-cycle-expansions-and-contractions
NBER, Business Cycle Dating chronology — nber.org/research/business-cycle-dating
NBER, announcement of 20 September 2010 (trough June 2009) — nber.org/news/business-cycle-dating-committee-announcement-september-20-2010
Nakaso, The financial crisis in Japan during the 1990s, BIS Papers No 6 — bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap06.pdf
BBC News, 9 August 2007 (BNP Paribas funds) — news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6938425.stm
Federal Reserve, TAF, 12 December 2007 — federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/20071212a.htm
Federal Reserve, PDCF, 16 March 2008 — federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20080316a.htm
Federal Reserve, bond purchases, 25 November 2008 — federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20081125b.htm
Federal Reserve, CPFF, 17 March 2020 — federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20200317a.htm
Federal Reserve, PDCF, 17 March 2020 — federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20200317b.htm
Federal Reserve, FOMC statement, 23 March 2020 — federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20200323a.htm
Federal Reserve, FOMC statement, 16 December 2015 (rate raised) — federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20151216a.htm
Federal Reserve, FOMC statement, 30 January 2019 (“patient”) — federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20190130a.htm
ECB, Securities Markets Programme, 10 May 2010 — ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2010/html/pr100510.en.html
ECB, three-year LTROs, 8 December 2011 — ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2011/html/pr111208_1.en.html
ECB, Draghi verbatim, 26 July 2012 — ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html
ECB, technical features of OMT, 6 September 2012 — ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html
European Commission, A new chapter for Greece — timeline of events — economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2018-08/05_timeline_of_events_2.pdf
European Commission, Report on Greek government deficit and debt statistics, COM(2010) 1 final — ec.europa.eu/eurostat/…/COM_2010_report_greek
Bank of England, gilt market operation, 28 September 2022 — bankofengland.co.uk/news/2022/september/bank-of-england-announces-gilt-market-operation
Bank of England, Quarterly Bulletin, gilt market case study, 20 November 2023 — bankofengland.co.uk/quarterly-bulletin/2023/2023/financial-stability-buy-sell-tools-a-gilt-market-case-study
Bureau of Labor Statistics, October 2009 release — bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_11062009.htm
Bureau of Labor Statistics, April 2020 release — bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_05082020.htm
Reuters, 9 March 2020 (7% fall, 15-minute market-wide halt) — reuters.com/graphics/USA-MARKETS/0100B5L144C
ICE BofA US High Yield Index option-adjusted spread, series BAMLH0A0HYM2 — fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLH0A0HYM2 — full daily history read from the archived series download of 3 November 2025 — web.archive.org/web/20251103031826/https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/fredgraph.csv?id=BAMLH0A0HYM2
One day-level note, not a month-level one: the Commission’s own timeline gives 19 October 2009 for the Greek deficit revision; the finance minister’s press statement was the next day, 20 October. The month is not in doubt and the 203-day gap moves by one day either way. Everything else on this page is pinned to an exact day by the source named beside it.